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a
Vertically Related Markets and
Protectionist Pressure Under Unfair Trade Laws
I. Introduction
What determines the structure of protection from foreign competition at a given
point in time is an issue that has attracted substantial interest during the last fif-
teen years. Attempting to augment early work that treated tariffs as exogenously
determined, a number of recent models have sought to explain the process leading to
prevailing tariff structures.' In the existing literature it is commonly assumed that
agents in an economy determine the equilibrium level of protection either through the
voting process and/or via direct lobbying of legislators. The position of each agent
with respect to the desired structure of protection is usually assumed to be a function
of factor ownership, with the precise pattern of interests determined by additional
variables such as factor mobility and the institutions through which preferences are
expressed.
At the same time that the endogenous tariff formation literature was developing,
import-competing firms were resorting with unprecedented vigor to instruments of
contingent or administered protection (Finger et al., 1982). These include emergency
protection, 2 voluntary export restraint agreements (VERs),3 countervailing duties
and antidumping duties.4 While the opportunity to exploit these avenues of admin-
istered protection existed in the past, direct lobbying of legislators was the revealed-
preferred path to protection in most instances. This is no longer true. As pointed out
by Destler (1986), for example, in the postwar period "(the US) Congress almost never
legislated specific import protection (p. 57)." In large part this change of tack reflects
1 Examples include Baldwin (1982), Findlay and Wellisz (1982), Mayer (1984), Cassing and Hillman
(1986), Hillman and Ursprung (1988) and Magee, Brock and Young (1989).
2 In the United States, for example, Section 201 of the Trade Act implements Article XIX of the GATT
(the so-called safeguards clause) which provides a contracting party with the right to escape temporarily
from its obligations if a trade concession under GATT has caused or threatens serious injury to a
domestic industry.
3These are generally government-to-government or government-to-industry agreements that restrict the
quantity supplied by foreign firms to a domestic market.
4Article VI of GATT empowers contracting parties to countervail certain export subsidies as long as
material injury to a domestic industry can be established. Article VI also empowers contracting parties
to impose duties on imports that have been dumped conditional on a showing of rnaterial injury.
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the outcome of successive rounds of multilateral trade negotiations (MTNs) under
auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which succeeded in
achieving significant reductions in average tariff levels. Moreover, these reductions
are bound, implying tariffs can only be raised if governments are prepared to offer
adequate compensation to affected countries. The MTN process and the resulting
contractual restraints on tariff levels has altered the nature of the protection-setting
and protection-seeking process. Pressures for protection have been deflected substan-
tially away from the legislative arena toward administrative and executive forums.5
Antidumping procedures are prominent among such favored instruments of contingent
protection, particularly in the United States, Canada, Australia, and the European
Community.
A consequence of this is that the level of protection in many industrialized coun-
tries to a significant extent is now determined by import-competing industries acting
in an administrative, rather than a legislative institutional setting. Instruments of
contingent trade policy such as antidumping procedures are not dependent on a vot-
ing process or on direct lobbying. Instead, they require that certain conditions be
met, such as injury from foreign competition. The decision to seek protection rests
on the perceived likelihood that the executive committee or commission will rule that
the conditions have indeed been met. Protection follows automatically if these crite-
ria are found to be satisfied. Consumers and negatively-affected user industries have
little say in the process. Recourse to antidumping actions under the so-called unfair
trade laws not only leads to an increase in the amount of protection granted directly,
but the threat of such actions tends to create conditions favorable to the successful
negotiation of VER-based protection. Determining an equilibrium level of protec-
tionist activity induced by the institutional foundation set by unfair trade laws is a
problem that has not been addressed in the endogenous-protection literature. This
paper offers a basic model that serves as a first attempt to fill that gap.
In what follows a simple model is developed that incorporates the major determi-
5It should be pointed out that the kind of direct lobbying activity commonly modelled in papers
on endogenous protection may have played a significant role in persuading legislators to change the
institutional setting in which protection is granted. I.M. Destler (1986) argues that the United States
Congress effectively delegated its constitutional authority to "regulate cornmerce with foreign nations"
to executive-branch agencies in order to protect itself from trade pressure.
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nants of intervention-seeking under unfair trade laws. Section II develops a model of
endogenous intervention seeking under unfair trade laws and explores the impact of
various variables on the proportion of import-competing industries that will seek pro-
tection. Anecdotal evidence suggests that upstream firms sometimes seek protection
which stands to severely injure their downstream customers. There have also been in-
stances where unaffiliated downstream customers have supported rather than opposed
attempts by upstream supplier industries to obtain potentially injurious protection
(Destler and Odell, 1987, p. 46). Such behavior, though paradoxical, is rationalized
by the extended model developed in Section III. This model examines the simultane-
ity of protection seeking across upstream and downstream industries. The level of
protection-seeking activity is determined endogenously for producers of intermediates
and final goods. It is shown that there is a tendency for protection seeking activity
in industries producing intermediates to influence protection seeking activity in final
goods sectors, and vice versa. The observation cited by Destler and Odell is rational-
ized in terms of what is called the "transmission-of-injury effect". Specifically, under
certain conditions downstream sectors may gain from upstream protection as it trans-
mits short-term injury downstream which, in turn, enhances downstream prospects
for gaining protection as well. There are, however, important qualifications. Sec-
tion IV concludes with a discussion of policy implications and directions for further
research.
II. A General Model of Intervention Seeking Under Unfair Trade Laws
The decision to seek protection under the unfair trade laws is dichotomous: an
import-competing firm or industry either files a complaint or it does not. Our objec-
tive in this section is to model the decision of a representative firm acting on behalf
of an import-competing industry to seek protection under the unfair trade laws. This
is done with an eye toward understanding factors that determine the prevalence of
intervention-seeking activity across all import-competing sectors of an economy. It is
well known that toward the end of the 197Os and into the 1980s there was a virtual
explosion of unfair trade complaints. We will show in Section III that the existence of
vertical linkages across industries establishes a link between protection-seeking activ-
ity across sectors. Specifically, we show that under conditions which appear to prevail,
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at least in the United States, there is a tendency for greater (less) protection-seeking
activity among upstream (downstream) sectors to induce the same in downstream
(upstream) sectors under the criteria established by unfair trade laws.
Consider a representative import-competing firm that faces the decision of whetheri
or not to pursue an unfair trade complaint. It is by now well-established that of the
two principal necessary conditions for winning an unfair trade complaint (showing
either subsidization or dumping and material injury), the injury criterion is the only
one likely to impose any obstacle to a favorable ruling.6 Hence whether a firm can
anticipate a favorable outcome, other things equal, depends on whether it is perceived
to satisfy the injury requirement. Because of the "low track" or administrative nature
of unfair trade laws, general-interest or social-welfare considerations play virtually no
role. The laws are administered without regard to economy-wide effects.7 For mod-
elling purposes current profitability is taken to be a composite measure of injury.8
Let a representative firm's current profitability be denoted 110. Higher levels of cur-
rent profit signal greater prosperity or reduced injury. Lower levels indicate reduced
prosperity or increased injury. The perceived probability of winning an unfair trade
petition, therefore, depends inversely on profits during the petitioning stage. The
expected return to protection seeking under the unfair trade laws depends on the
expected profits of protection relative to those under the status quo.
Let H1, denote the expected present value (EPV) of the flow of future profits un-
6 Material injury is the legal term used in the GATT and in US trade legislation. It is a rather ill-
defined standard that revolves around the "health" of an industry as reflected in the levels and trends
of production, capacity utilization, market share, inventories, and profits (Kaplan, 1991). Finger and
Murray (1990, p. 39), in looking at the United States unfair trade cases, found that "in almost every
unfair trade case that gets to a formal determination, the US government finds that the foreigners
are unfair-that the foreign merchandise has been dumped or subsidized. When the US government
turns down a petition for an import restriction it is almost always because the injury test is negative."
Hindley (1988), Messerlin (1989) and Norall (1987) have all demonstrated that current procedures
make it relatively easy to show that dumping has occurred.
SAlthough no public-interest provisions are included in US unfair trade laws, the European Community
and Canada do have such provisions. However, while consideration of the public interest is included
in Section 45 of Canada's Special Import Measures Act, Porteous and Rugman (1989) point out that
in the four years following the inception of this provision there were just three public interest hearings
initiated in a pool of 29 completed unfair trade actions. Similarly, Messerlin (1989) points out that
the EC's "community interest" clause has no practical effect.
8 Baldwin (1985) found that the change in profit had a significant inverse effect on the ITC's injury
decision in Section 201 (escape clause) cases. In their study of the US steel industry's use of unfair
trade laws from 1982 to 1986, Herander and Pupp (1991) found that industry profitability and the
change in profitability were again significant determinants in the injury decision.
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der protection and H denote the EPV of the flow of future profits under the current
state of commercial policy facing that sector (i.e., no AD duties are in place). Note
that Ho need not equal IHf due to variations in profits over time. The problem of a
representative firm is expressed as follows (we assume that such a problem character-
izes the behavior of an industry association when the industry is composed of more
than one firm):
max q(s,IIo,9)llp + [1 -q(s,llo,O6)]f - c -s, (1)
ae{o,1}
where s E {0, 1} represents the decision to file a petition (s = 1) or not (s = 0), c
is the processing cost associated with filing a petition, the function q(-) denotes the
probability of winning protection as a function of the filing variable, current profits
and a vector 9 that captures other elevant factors.9
Under the unfair trade laws protection cannot be won unless a petition is filed.
Hence
q(0, IIo, 9B) = 0 V llo and 9.
Clearly the decision hinges on a simple comparison between the EPV of profits under
seeking (s = 1) versus those when remaining passive (s = 0). Consider the nature
of this problem. First, in those industries in which H, < IIf, then for all c > 0 the
optimal choice is s = 0. That is, if the effect of protection on the EPV of future profits
is perceived to be nonpositive (perhaps due to expectations of foreign retaliation), it
never pays to seek protection. Only if H, > H will it ever be optimal to seek
protection. When this is true there exists a threshold at which an import-competing
industry is just indifferent between seeking and not seeking protection. This threshold
is defined implicitly in terms of Hp, llo, H, c and 9 by the following equation:
q(s, Ho, )llp + [1 - q(s, llo, 6)]1lf7 - c s = IIf. (2)
We refer to this critical value of HI, as the seeking threshold and denote it by 1*.
9Such factors would include, for example, the past behavior of the conrnission with respect to its
willingness to find injury, whether some firms within the industry actually oppose the petition at
the time it is presented to the commission, the extent to which foreign-policy based considerations
influence the mind set of some commissioners, factors influencing the likelihood of finding a dumping
margin (e.g., given imports from nonmarket economies, determining whether or not dumping exists
will depend on either a constructed value methodology or a comparable third market price. Which
methodology is invoked is sometimes a political decision.), and other political intangibles not under
the control of the industry.
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Since the firm is indifferent between seeking and not seeking protection at the
seeking threshold we can set 8 = 1 and rewrite (2) as:
c = q(llo,96)[l* - H f]. (3)
Equation (3) yields combinations of c and H*, for given values of Ho,69 and H,
for which a firm is indifferent between seeking and not seeking protection. This
line appears in Figure 1 as the positively sloped ray out of the point Hf on the
horizontal axis. The slope of this ray is q(Ho, 9). Figure 1 describes the decision of
a representative firm in any given import-competing industry to either seek or not
seek protection. The intersection of the ray out of H f and the horizontal line at c
determines the value for the perceived EPV of profit under protection beyond which
a sector will unambiguously pursue protection and below which it will not. This
seeking threshold for H, is, of course, defined implicitly as a function of 1o, H , c and
9 by equation (3). Let this implicit function be denoted by
1*= 11*(Ho,lh, 9 ,c).
From the set of all import-competing sectors not currently protected, those sectors
that perceive the profits of protection to be above H* have an incentive to file a
petition for protection under the unfair trade laws.
A sector's perception of the profitability of protection will tend to vary depending
on their anticipation of foreign retaliation, sector-specific barriers to entry and exit,
the anticipated duration of protection if granted, and so on. The dispersion and
concentration of beliefs concerning the profits of protection across all of the import-
competing sectors can be represented abstractly by either a probability mass function
(for a discrete number of sectors) or by a probability density function (p.d.f.) (for
a continuum of sectors). We assume that there is a continuum of import-competing
industries for simplicity of exposition. Let the p.d.f. representing the dispersion of
beliefs concerning the profitability of protection across import-competing sectors be
given by f(7r,).
If we assume that all industries face the same processing costs associated with
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seeking protection (c),10 the same EPV of profit under free trade (Hf),1 1 the same pre-
protection level of well-being as represented by current profits (Ho),12 and the same
parameter 9, then a simple diagrammatic representation of the proportion of import-
competing industries seeking protection under the unfair trade laws is possible.13
This is achieved by superimposing the p.d.f. f(rp) on the diagram in Figure 1. This is
done in Figure 2.14 Given the distribution of the perceived profits of protection across
import-competing sectors, the proportion of sectors that will petition for protection
is captured by the shaded region under the p.d.f. Algebraically, the proportion of
existing import-competing sectors that will petition for protection is expressed as:
P = 7 f(rp)drp = 1 -F(l*(Ho,lUj,Q6,c)), (4)
H* (Ho,Hy ,6,c)
where F(-) is the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) corresponding to f (7r,).15
10 This is not too unrealistic since all industries seeking protection under unfair trade laws face the same
kinds of requirements.
11 Such an assumption is justifiable if we note that in the long run under competitive conditions normal
profits will prevail, and factor mobility will tend to establish normal profits across industries.
12 This is more difficult to justify except, perhaps, in a more discrete sense. That is, if the profitability
variable is principally relevant in terms of being "high" or "low"("good times" or "bad times"), then
a business cycle-based explanation can justify such an assumption.
13 The reason for focusing on the proportion as a measure of protectionist activity instead of on the level
of equilibrium tariffs is that under unfair trade laws the level of an antidumping duty is generally set
according to the size of the dumping margin. Hence the level of protection is not influenced by seeking
activity alone. The resulting average antidumping duty is a function of the extent of seeking activity,
but also depends on conditions beyond the reach of domestic import-competing industries such as
average dumping margins.
14 The simplifications underlying Figure 2 are not at all necessary to the results. For example, as noted
below, if Ho was thought to vary across import-competing sectors, then a three dimensional diagram
analogous to Figure 2 would apply. A great deal of pedagogical value is gained by introducing the
diagrammatic method of analysis while giving up very little in terms of the richness of the model.
15 Observe that, for example, if Ho was also thought to vary across industries, and if H, and Ho are
distributed independently, then we obtain the following expression for P:
P = f(rrp)g(ro)d7rpd7ro
o ng(no,nIf,,c)
= 1- F(Hn,(no, Hf ,60, c))] g('ro) d'ro
= 1 - E{F(H(iro,Uf ,6,c))}
where g(7ro) describes the distribution of initial profits across all import-competing industries andEg
denotes the expectation over *ro. Hence, we obtain a version of equation (4) in terms of the expected
value over ro.
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Using equations (3) and (4) we obtain the following set of comparative-static
derivatives.
BH1* 1(91;0 1(5)
Dc q(IIo,9) > 0
BHi* [H,-f






-- = < 0(8)
Dc q(llo,O)
= f(I*)- <0 (9)
aIto q(Ilo, 9)
8P
S-f(11) < 0. (10)
These comparative-static exercises can be performed diagrammatically. Figure 2
shows the effect of a reduction in current profitability across all import-competing
firms (due for example to a downturn in the business cycle). Because the seeking
threshold, II*, declines the proportion of firms seeking protection in this new state
rises. For finite changes the extent to which this proportion rises depends critically on
the area under f (ir,) in the region just below the initial equilibrium seeking threshold.
Some policy implications are readily apparent from the expressions in equations
(8)-(10). Equation (8) indicates that reductions in the processing costs associated
with filing antidumping petitions will tend to induce a higher level of seeking activity.
This suggests, inter alia, that monetary penalties imposed on petitioning industries
whose petition is denied will act to inhibit seeking activity. Equation (9) suggests that
policymakers should anticipate increased protection-seeking activity during periods
of general macroeconomic decline. During such periods import-competing industries
are more likely to satisfy the injury criteria for protection and hence petitioning
for protection becomes more attractive at the margin. Equation (10) suggests the
following example. Suppose the status quo consists of a given set of tariff levels.
A reduction in tariff levels across the board, due perhaps to the outcome of the
multilateral trade negotiations, suggests greater openness to foreign competition in
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the future, other things equal. Under conditions of imperfect competition in the initial
state this suggests that import-competing firms could anticipate a reduction in the
EPV of the flow of future profits under this new status quo; that is, lf declines. To
the extent that such a shock affects industry perceptions of IIless than IIf, the effect
of the negotiated tariff reduction will be to stimulate petitions for protection under
the unfair trade laws. Of course, this is perfectly consistent with casual observation
of post-war events in the US. As tariff ceilings were reduced under successive GATT
Rounds, resort to other administrative avenues for protection has increased.
A weakness of the above model is the extent to which the import-competing sec-
tors of an economy remain undifferentiated in any important way. That is, sectors are
treated as fundamentally the same, varying only in their perceptions of the profitabil-
ity of protection, captured by the p.d.f. f(r). It was argued above that the model
could be extended to allow sector-specific variations in the parameters IIf, 9 and IIo,
but that this was a rather trivial exercise, adding virtually nothing to the insights of
the model. However, the observation of Destler and Odell noted earlier, that there
have been instances in which downstream firms have publicly supported potentially
destructive bids for protection by their upstream suppliers immediately suggests a
nontrivial dimension in which import-competing firms might be categorized. In the
following section the model is extended to include the notion of upstream and down-
stream import-competing sectors. The extension points out several channels through
which changes in protection-seeking activity among upstream firms will influence pro-
tection seeking downstream, and vice versa.
III. Upstream and Downstream Industries: Vertical Linkages and Reper-
cussions in Protection Seeking
The above model of the prevalence of protection seeking applies to all import-
competing industries independent of their position along the production stream. In
order to analyze the effects of vertical linkages along the production stream on the
prevalence of seeking activity (P) we must ask what relevant information is introduced
by noting an industry's status in this regard?
Several observations are pertinent. The greater the incidence of upstream pro-
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tection seeking (Pu), the greater is the expected level of protection upstream and the
greater is the probability that protection will be granted if sought downstream. The
reason is that protection seeking upstream, as it is translated into protection up-
stream, tends to transmit injury to downstream sectors. That is, higher input prices
imply a reduction in current profitability downstream, All < 0.16 But the trans-
mission of injury is not the only channel through which protection seeking upstream
may effect seeking in downstream sectors. Greater protection-seeking upstream also
influences the expected present value of profits under the status quo in downstream
sectors, ll. Generally, greater protection upstream will imply higher input prices
facing downstream industries and so lower profits. Greater protection upstream im-
plies as well a decline in the EPV of profits under protection for downstream sectors
(ll). Hence, through all of these channels the level of protection seeking upstream
affects the level of protection seeking downstream. Before saying anything about
the channels through which downstream seeking might affect upstream behavior, the
problem facing a representative firm in a downstream sector is examined, incorporat-
ing the linkages to upstream seeking activity suggested above. The problem facing a
representative downstream firm can then be expressed as follows.
max q(s, l(PU), 9 d) H d(PU) + i - q(s, llg(Pu), 8d)] II(P") - c - . (11)
8E{o,1} L
The functions Hog(Pu), Hll(P"u), and Hj(P u) represent the relationship between
upstream protection seeking (and implicitly the level of actual protection upstream)
and current profits downstream, the EPV of profits under protection downstream, and
the EPV of profits under ongoing free trade in the downstream sector, respectively.
As suggested above, the first derivatives have the following signs: dlg/dP < 0,
dllj/dPU < 0 and dllj/dPU < 0, for all downstream industries.
16 It should be noted that at the same time that higher domestic input prices reduce current profitability
for domestic downstream firms, imports will tend to rise to fill the implied domestic demand gap
downstream. That is, decreases in Ils due to increased factor prices will coincide with rising imports
downstream. This implied contemporaneous change in import levels reinforces the claimed effect on
the probability of protection. That is, because imports can be expected to rise contemporaneously the
conferred injury will appear as if it is due, in part, to imports.
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The problem facing industries producing intermediate inputs can be expressed
similarly, but care must be taken in specifying the linkages between downstream inter-
vention seeking and the state of upstream sectors. There are important asymmetries
that distinguish upstream from downstream sectors in this context. For example, the
transmission of injury to downstream sectors due to greater upstream protection does
not occur in reverse. Indeed the opposite is sometimes true. If upstream sectors are
sufficiently concentrated to exercise market power they might instead expect to gain
from downstream protection as they may be able to capture a share of the protection-
enhanced downstream profits. To the extent that there is an open market for foreign
intermediates, however, domestic upstream sectors (we are analyzing the decision of
whether or not to seek protection facing all those currently not receiving protection)
will not generally be able to capture any of the profits of increased downstream pro-
tection. If producers of intermediates in the rest of the world are free to enter the
home market, then downstream protection can offer no greater prospective profits to
a domestic upstream industry. The opportunity for excess profits will be competed
away by foreign competition. In other words, a domestic industry producing inter-
mediates cannot hope to capture a share of the downstream profits of protection as
long as it operates under the discipline of free trade. Under open markets upstream,
therefore, downstream protection is likely to have no effect on the profitability of
upstream sectors unless they also are shielded from foreign competition. This sug-
gests that unlike the case of downstream industries, II and II' are independent of
the extent of protection seeking downstream, Pd. On the other hand, should an up-
stream sector be granted protection, then greater protection downstream suggests a
greater opportunity to capture downstream profits than otherwise. Hence the profits
of protection in upstream industries will tend to depend positively on the level of
downstream protection. This indicates that II" is a positive function of pd. The
problem facing a representative upstream sector can be expressed as
max q(s, IHg, 9 ")II,"(Pd) + [1 - q(s, IHg, 9*)]IIl - - s. (12)
sE{O,1}
As indicated above, because greater protection seeking downstream suggests higheri
levels of downstream protection, and because domestic producers of intermediates can
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expect to capture some of the profits of downstream protection as long as their foreign
competitors are held at bay, we conclude that
dll
dPd>0 ,
for all upstream industries.
The expected-profit threshold beyond which import-competing industries will find
it profitable to petition for protection can now be defined for both upstream and
downstream industries, 1 *d and II*' respectively.
c = q(flO(pu),96d)[Hl*d - dII(PU)] (13)
c = q(ll, 9U)[l*U - H ], (14)
where the argument s = 1 has been dropped from the function q(.) for notational
simplicity. Only those downstream sectors that perceive the EPV of profits under
protection to exceed 1 1*d and only those upstream sectors that perceive the EPV ofP
profits under protection to exceed Il* will petition for protection. Equations (13)
and (14) define these thresholds implicitly as the following functions:
= IId(fld(pu), IId(Pu), c, 6d
=IId(P"L c, 09 d) (15)
and
II**. = II**(II , II U, c,) 9U).(16)
Equations (15) and (16) indicate that the seeking threshold for downstream firms
is a function of upstream protection seeking, P", while that for upstream firms is
independent of downstream protection seeking, pd.
We can now follow the procedure developed in the previous section while separat-
ing import-competing industries into two blocks: upstream and downstream. Across
all downstream sectors the variety of beliefs about the profits of protection across sec-
tors can be represented by a p.d.f. conditional on the (perceived) level of upstream
protection seeking. This conditional p.d.f. is expressed as h(7raPu). Similarly, there
is a conditional p.d.f. that represents the distribution of beliefs about the profits of
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protection across upstream industries given the (perceived) level of downstream pro-
tection seeking. This conditional p.d.f. is expressed as g(7r,"Pd). The proportion of
upstream import-competing industries that will petition for protection is determined
by superimposing the distribution of 7r ' conditional on Pd on a diagram that locates
the seeking threshold for upstream firms. The proportion of downstream import-
competing industries that will petition for protection is determined by superimposing
the distribution of 7r conditional on P" on a diagram that locates the seeking thresh-
old for downstream firms . That is, a diagram like that in Figure 2 now applies to
all upstream and all downstream import-competing industries (that are not currently
receiving protection), but both the seeking threshold and the distribution of the EPV
of profits under protection differ across upstream and downstream industries. Alge-




pd = 1 - H Id(Pu, c,98d) Pu (17)




P" =1 -- G II**(IIul, IP, , ") Pd .(18)
Equations (17) and (18) define, in effect, reaction functions for upstream and
downstream industries in terms of the prevalence of protection seeking, P 1 and pd.
They show the proportion of downstream (upstream) industries to seek protection
given their beliefs about upstream (downstream) protection seeking. Together these
equations determine a pair of P11 and Pd that are consistent in the sense that beliefs
correspond to actual levels of protection seeking. The equilibrium prevalence of pro-
tection seeking among upstream import-competing industries and among downstream
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import-competing industries is determined, therefore, by the simultaneous solution
of these equations.
The slopes of the two reaction curves can be determined algebraically by dif-
ferentiating equations (17) and (18).17 Nevertheless, determining these slopes can
proceed on a more intuitive level by using a diagram. Consider first the sensitivity of
p" to APd along the reaction curve defined by equation (18). As indicated in (16),
the seeking threshold for upstream industries is unchanged by APd. Thus if there
is a change in P* following a change in pd it must come through a change in the
conditional distribution of 7r,. In fact, the displacement of the conditional p.d.f. in
response to APd > 0 can be deduced from the condition that dIIp"/dP d> 0 for all
upstream industries. 18 This implies that the p.d.f. of gr, is displaced everywhere to
the right. That is, greater protection seeking downstream implies that all upstream
sectors benefit in the expected sense if they are shielded from foreign competition.
Protection offers a greater opportunity to profit given the prospect of capturing a
share of the greater protection-induced downstream profits. Figure 3 shows the re-
sponse of PU to AP d in the upstream case. It is clear that under the conditions set
out
dP*
> 0. (19)dPd upstream
Further, the closer the derivative dII"/dPd is to zero for all upstream sectors, the
flatter is this reaction curve. Exercises analogous to that appearing in Figure 2, as
well as the comparative-static derivatives equations 8-10 appearing in the previous
section, determine the direction and extent of a shift in the reaction curve.
The same sort of diagrammatic approach can be employed to determine the slope
of the reaction function for the downstream sectors. Consider an increase in P".
The effect of this on pd can be decomposed into three distinct pieces (since II,
I 1 , and IId are each functions of P") as shown in Figure 4. First, the increase in
upstream protection seeking tends to cause current downstream profits to decline,19
17 In doing this it is helpful to rewrite the conditional p.d.f's as the ratio of the appropriate joint and
marginal p.d.f.'s. However, the algebra, in this case, does not extend the diagrammatic analysis and
the discussion that follows above. Therefore it is omitted.
18 Recall the discussion above where it is argued that both Ilj and IIQ are independent of Pd.
19 It should be noted that in a model with discrete time periods there will be a lag between an increase
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dlg/dPu < 0 for all downstream industries. Other things equal, this tends to increase
the prevalence of downstream protection seeking as the ray out of ll rotates upward.
The seeking threshold tends to decline toward that at point B. In other words, there
is a tendency for protection seeking upstream to lead to greater protection seeking
downstream because upstream protection transmits injury to downstream sectors,
thereby enhancing the probability of protection for each downstream sector. Those
downstream sectors that had been on the margin of seeking and not seeking are
thrown over the seeking threshold, other things equal. If this were the only link
between P' and pd, the reaction curve for the prevalence of downstream protection
seeking would be positively sloped.
An increase in P' also tends to cause downstream industries to adjust their
expectations about the present value of the future flow of profits under ongoing free
trade (or, the status quo). Specifically, dll/dPU < 0 will generally be true. Because
of greater anticipated protection upstream, and consequently higher input prices,
downstream sectors can expect a reduction in future profit flows under ongoing free
trade. Other things equal, the status quo (no protection) tends again to become less
attractive and there is a tendency for protection seeking to increase downstream.
This effect appears in Figure 4 as a leftward shift in the ray out of ll. This and the
previously mentioned effect will be referred to jointly as the transmission-of-injury
effect. Other things equal, the transmission-of-injury effect points toward a positive
relationship between pd and P' for downstream industries as the seeking threshold
is reduced by an increase in PU.
The final effect of APu on pd operates through the function ll(Pu). Since
dlld/dPu < 0, this effect tends in the direction of countering the transmission-of-
injury effect. Figure 4 shows this countervailing force as a leftward shift in the
p.d.f. of 1Hd Without further restrictions it is clear then that the reaction curve
for downstream industries can be positively or negatively sloped. Observe, however,
in upstream protection seeking and downstream injury. Nevertheless, while the algebra is a bit more
tedious, the results remain unchanged. Only some very intuitive qualifications arise concerning the
appropriate timing of these events when this intertemporal characteristic is explicitly included.
15
that if
f AId >AI V downstream sectors => dPd > 0. (21)fl P dP downstean
This says that a sufficient condition for the transmission-of-injury effect to dominate
is that for each downstream sector the effect of upstream protection on the EPV of
future profit flows has either an equivalent effect on II and Il, or the perceived effect
on II is not greater than that on IlI. It should be emphasized that this is not a nec-
essary condition for the transmission-of-injury effect to dominate. The observation
made by Destler and Odell that there have been cases where downstream firms have
supported directly harmful upstream bids for protection suggests that such firms per-
ceived themselves to be made better off under greater upstream protection. This can
only be the case to the extent that the transmission-of-injury effect is the dominating
force. If downstream firms perceive their prospect of protection to be substantially
enhanced through the transmission of injury this provides a self-interested motive for
supporting an upstream bid for protection.
The implied linkages between protection-seeking activity in upstream and down-
stream import-competing industries are analyzed in Figures 5 and 6. Figure 5 depicts
the case in which the transmission-of-injury effect dominates but is small (implying
a positively sloped and relatively steep P dPd' schedule). Such cases will be said to
imply a "weakly dominant" transmission-of-injury effect. Figure 6 depicts the case in
which the transmission-of-injury effect dominates and is large (implying a positively
sloped and relatively flat PdPd' schedule). Such cases imply a "strongly dominant"
transmission-of-injury effect. The equilibrium level of intervention seeking in up-
stream and downstream sectors is determined by point A. This equilibrium is stable
as long as p dp d' is steeper than P*Pu', as it is in Figure 5 under the weakly dominant
transmission-of-injury effect. It is unstable when the transmission-of-injury effect is
strongly dominant as in Figure 6.
Consider the stable case. In Figure 5 the effect of an exogenous increase in the
incidence of upstream protection seeking is analyzed. This might have been caused,
for example, by an autonomous increase in the expected profitability of protection
across upstream sectors. Alternatively, an autonomous decline in current profitability
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in upstream sectors, which has the effect of increasing the probability of protection
if sought, will also cause the PUPU' schedule to shift upward. In the case of a stable
equilibrium (weakly dominant transmission-of-injury effect), the increase in upstream
protection seeking transmits injury across downstream sectors and induces greater
protection seeking downstream. Greater protection seeking downstream is, in turn,
transmitted back to the upstream industries by enhancing the xpected profitability of
protection. That is, by inducing greater protection seeking downstream, protection-
seeking activity upstream becomes marginally more attractive as upstream indus-
tries can hope to capture a share of the downstream profits under greater expected
protection. Hence the exogenous stimulus to the incidence of upstream protection
seeking causes seeking to cascade downstream while at the same time generating re-
inforcing repercussion effects. Had an exogenous increase in seeking been introduced
downstream this would have induced greater protection seeking upstream due to the
perceived increase in the profitability of protection. In turn, greater upstream seeking
leads to the transmission of injury downstream which induces an added increase in
downstream seeking activity. This process converges on a new equilibrium at point
B as long as neither effect is too strong relative to the other. That is, as long as the
transmission-of-injury effect is relatively weak (but dominant, implying a relatively
steep PdPd') and the effect on II'(Pd) is not too strong (implying a relatively flat
PUP''), the adjustment process converges on a new stable equilibrium.
This discussion indicates that the results of this section are qualitatively similar to
those in Section II. Specifically, the sign of the comparative-static derivative suggested
above is as indicated in equation (9) of the previous section. An expression like
equation (9), however, tends to understate the magnitude of the effect since the
possible existence of reinforcing repercussion effects was not picked up in the previous
version of the model. Hence, by explicitly incorporating the existence of vertical
linkages across instances of protection-seeking activity, we have a refined sense of the
magnitude of the endogenous response to exogenous changes that effect such activity.
It should be noted also that a decrease in the processing costs associated with filing
a petition for protection will shift the P"PU' schedule upward and the P dPd' to
the right, leading again to the same qualitative comparative-static result suggested
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in equation (8), but with a repercussions effect that reinforces the impact of the
initial shock. Finally, it should be kept in mind that the results indicated above are
conditional on a weakly dominant transmission-of-injury effect.
The unstable case should not be ruled out a priori. After all, there was, with
little exaggeration, explosive growth in both petitions and favorable rulings under
unfair trade laws in the US, and to a lesser extent the EC and Canada, during the
1980s. Whether this growth is best explained in terms of movement toward a new
stable equilibrium (as in Figure 5) or as reflecting an inherent instability in the system
is not clear. Figure 6 shows the effect of an exogenous increase in the incidence of
upstream seeking when the transmission-of-injury effect is strongly dominant. If the
system was initially at point A, the shock leaves the economy above the new equi-
librium. Both upstream and downstream sectors move toward a greater proportion
of protection seeking. The process ends only when all upstream or all downstream
import-competing firms (from among those not currently receiving protection) peti-
tion for protection. That is, when one block of sectors or the other runs into the con-
straint P < 1. Again, the quantitative implications suggested here differ from those
derived in the previous extension. It is noteworthy also that while the strongly dom-
inant transmission-of-injury effect implies a new equilibrium combination of P' and
pd that implies reduced seeking among both upstream and downstream industries,
the implied instability of the system points to the same kind of cascading protection
that is observed in the weakly dominant case.
In addition, recall that the slope of P UPu' approaches zero as the derivative
dIII/dPd approaches zero. This suggests that when upstream sectors perceive just a
small opportunity to capture the profits associated with higher levels of downstream
protection, a weakly dominant transmission-of-injury effect will apply and the stable
case of Figure 5 is assured. In such cases, autonomous shocks affecting protection
seeking are transmitted from upstream to downstream sectors, but not vice versa.
Finally, there remains the possibility that the transmission-of-injury effect may
not be dominant, implying a downward sloping PdPd' curve. Whether this is the case
is an empirical question. It cannot be deduced from the model. If the transmission-of-
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injury effect is dominated the possibility arises that an autonomous increase (decrease)
in protection seeking among upstream sectors will induce a decrease (increase) in
protection seeking downstream. This opens up the possibility that protection-seeking
activity may decline on net (i.e., offsetting upstream increases with downstream de-
creases) in response to an autonomous increase in seeking among upstream industries.
The intuition for this result is apparent from the model. If the transmission-of-injury
effect is not dominant this implies that downstream firms perceive, on balance, that
greater upstream protection seeking (and hence greater implied levels of future pro-
tection) will disproportionately affect their expectations of the profitability of protec-
tion downstream. Specifically, the dominating force here is that downstream sectors
see any excess profits of protection as being largely captured by upstream sectors
given their protection-enhanced market power. Hence, seeking protection becomes
less attractive given higher levels of upstream seeking rather than more attractive.
Potentially perverse policy implications under such conditions are obvious.
For example, consider an increase in the processing costs associated with filing
an AD petition. Policy makers may have intended this increase to induce a reduc-
tion in protection-seeking activity, as suggested by equation (8). However, if the
transmission-of-injury effect is dominated, so that the PdPd' is negatively sloped,
the increase in processing costs -may induce an increase in seeking activity among
downstream import-competing sectors. That is, diagrammatically (figure not shown)
a positively sloped P'P' curve would shift downward due to the increase in pro-
cessing costs. At the same time, a negatively sloped P dp d' curve shifts to the left.
As a result the equilibrium level of seeking activity among upstream sectors unam-
biguously declines, but among downstream sectors it may rise or fall. The intuition
for this ambiguous result is similar to that outlined above. When the transmission-
of-injury effect is dominated, any increase in upstream protection seeking acts on
balance to suggest greater consolidation of market power upstream and so a greater
opportunity to capture downstream profits. Similarly, if there is a reduction in seek-
ing activity upstream (due to the direct effect of an increase in processing costs),
this points to a reduction in the consolidation of upstream market power and hence
increases the potential for profit under protection for downstream sectors. This is
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because the decline in upstream market power diminishes the extent to which such
profits will accrue upstream rather than downstream. Hence under an increase in pro-
cessing costs, downstream sectors will face conflicting forces. Other things equal, the
increase in processing costs tends to discourage protection seeking. But the induced
reduction in protection seeking upstream acts to induce greater protection-seeking ac-
tivity downstream when the transmission-of-injury effect is dominated. If this latter
force is sufficiently strong, an increase in the processing costs associated with filing
an unfair trade petition may ultimately stimulate protection-seeking activity among
downstream sectors. The induced change in market structure upstream clearly lies
at the heart of this result.
IV. Discussion, Policy Implications, and Concluding Remarks
The central purpose of this paper has been to analyze endogenous protection-
seeking activity under the institutional foundation set by unfair trade laws. This
is a significant departure from the tradition in the literature which has treated the
problem of endogenous protection as unfolding in a legislative rather than an adminis-
trative institutional setting. In addition, the distinction between upstream and down-
stream import-competing sectors was identified as fundamental to understanding the
mechanism for the transmission of protection-seeking shocks across import-competing
sectors. While this distinction arises naturally given the incentive structure created
by unfair trade laws, it should be noted that introducing the upstream-downstream
distinction would likely also enhance our understanding of the causal processes of
endogenous protection in the traditional voting/lobbying models. Hence the current
model provides a point of departure for further research in the area of endogenous
protection under an administrative institutional setting, while also pointing out the
need to examine the significance of the upstream-downstream distinction in existing
voting/lobbying models.
We found that when the transmission-of-injury effect is dominant, under a wide
range of parameter values anything that inhibits protection seeking upstream also in-
hibits protection seeking downstream, and vice versa. Anything that stimulates pro-
tection seeking upstream also stimulates it downstream, and vice versa. If, however,
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the transmission-of-injury effect is dominated, then increased (decreased) protection
seeking among downstream firms tends to stimulate (retard) upstream seeking, while
increased (decreased) protection seeking among upstream firms will tend to reduce
(stimulate) downstream seeking, other things equal.
Our objective has been to build a general model of endogenous protection seeking
in an unfair-trade-law setting. In the process, some potentially interesting details were
omitted that suggest possible areas for future research. First, the extent to which
upstream protection will transmit actual injury downstream depends on such things
as the flexibility of downstream technology, the availability of substitute inputs, the
extent to which the world market for the downstream good is competitive, and so
on. Whether or not the transmission-of-injury effect is weakly dominant, strongly
dominant or not dominant is likely to depend on such details related to downstream
technologies and market structures. Furthermore, the question must be asked: is it
possible that the likelihood of a sufficiently powerful injurious shock to downstream
customers might instead induce upstream suppliers of intermediates to shy away from
protection seeking? That is, can the expectation of transmitted injury act directly to
inhibit rather than stimulate protection seeking? Preliminary work indicates that in a
special case in which the very survival of a downstream industry would be jeopardized
by upstream protection it often still pays to seek protection upstream. , Moreover, it
frequently pays for downstream firms to support such efforts.
Another issue that has been ignored is the fact that alternative instruments of
administered protection exist. The unfair trade laws are an example of adminis-
tered protection, but VERs and emergency protection are also potentially available.
Indeed, it is generally agreed that these instruments are strategically linked. For
example, it is often argued that the threat of invoking AD is often used to gain a
VER agreement. How might such linkages affect the endogenous level of protection
and protection seeking? Finally, the linkages between the incentives set out in this
model and the details of competition or antitrust policy is potentially important. It
is well known that in the US and the European Community, unfair trade laws and
competition laws are largely at odds; the former protect domestic firms from "unfair"
foreign pricing practices (practices that are pro-competitive), and the latter protect
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competition from anti-competitive strategies by firms. Whether and to what extent
sanctions might be invoked under antitrust laws when market power is conferred by
protection granted under unfair trade laws will complicate the inter-linkages across
sectors between instances of protection seeking. Such issues, however, are probably
best studied within a general framework of protection seeking under administrative
rules and discretion, rather than starting from scratch in each case. The model pre-
sented in this paper offers a point of departure for such further research.
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